The Colombian Conflict has Changed in Recent Years: But Military Strategy Hasn't
The Colombian Conflict has Changed in Recent Years: But Military Strategy Hasn't
President Petro promised to move away from the military strategies of his predecessors, but it seems someone forgot to tell the military itself
Daniela and Joshua are recently returned from the jungles of Chocó, where a plethora of armed groups fight one another for territorial control, and residents are caught in the crossfire.
The trip was enlightening, and we will have some stories with other media companies next week about what we saw. But for Joshua, the trip really drove home a point he had been considering for awhile— despite promises by President Gustavo Petro to leave behind the military strategies of the civil war and adapt to the new conflict dynamics of the next generation of criminal groups, on-the-ground conditions in the conflict zones themselves seem unchanged.
This week we’re taking a look at exactly what that means for his “Total Peace” plans, as well as for affected communities.
The Colombian Conflict has Changed in Recent Years: But Military Strategy Hasn't
President Petro promised to move away from the military strategies of his predecessors, but it seems someone forgot to tell the military itself
“I don’t see any ‘Total Peace’,” said Arsenio, governor of a small community of Emberá indigenous people in Alto Baudó, in Chocó, Colombia. He was referring to the plan of President Petro Gustavo to end decades of conflict in Colombia.
For him, it has just been more empty promises from a government in Bogotá that has a long history of making promises that go unfulfilled.
“At least with the FARC, they mostly left us alone,” he said. “Now we face open fighting, confinements, forced recruitment, sexual abuse of our women, and even explosive mines in our territory”.
The Colombian conflict has changed dramatically in recent years as new armed groups battle for control of the region. The goals and motives of armed groups have changed considerably since the civil war, and Colombian military forces have failed to adapt.
When the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace treaty with the government in 2016, ending a 53-year civil war, residents who lived in affected regions hoped it was the beginning of the end of the incessant violence and strife that had gripped their communities for as long as they could remember.
The occasion even inspired a visit to the country by then-pope Francis, who said in public comments at the time, “Peace is what Colombia has been seeking. A stable, lasting peace, so that we see and treat each other as brothers, never as enemies.
As FARC fighters disarmed en masse and rejoined civil society however, government promises to build infrastructure and economic investment in the marginalized communities they controlled went unfulfilled.
And though violence did drop immediately after the accord, the vacuum of power left behind was quickly filled by other smaller armed groups, who have since grown exponentially in numbers and territory. Dreams of an end to violence in affected communities evaporated along with their hopes that the government would invest in conflict regions, and bring them into decision-making processes by the national government in Bogotá.
Aggressive military strategies in recent years have failed to stem growing violence, and militarization of regions in dispute have in many ways only made things worse.
Tactics that worked from the State’s perspective against the FARC, have not worked against contemporary armed groups, who have very different motives and operating procedures than the FARC did during the civil war.
This new generation of armed groups are often “uninterested or unable to confront Colombian military forces directly,” says International Crisis Group in a report from February. Direct confrontations between security forces and criminal armed groups are rare, and the vast majority of fighting occurs between armed groups themselves.
Unlike FARC forces, groups in the post-accord period don’t hope to achieve a military victory against Colombian security forces that topples the government, but rather employ a strategy of consolidating control among the populations that the state has largely abandoned
And yet Colombian security forces use largely the same tactics developed during the civil war— aggressive military actions that often end up harming communities as well as the criminal groups they target, and which have failed to achieve lasting results.
“In many ways, the conflict is worse now than before,” said Hernando Enriquez, a mission leader in Chocó at the humanitarian organization Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), “especially for indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations who exist in areas without a state presence.”
Enriquez explained that at least when the region was firmly under control of the FARC, operational protocols were clear, as were terms of engagement. “But now, with various groups fighting for territorial control, it has become much more unpredictable.”
New groups, and pre-existing forces that have become ascendent in recent years, are now deeply ingrained in the communities they control, with tendrils that stretch into every aspect of the economy. Fueled not only by narcotics profits, but also by illegal mining, extorsion, and ties to licit economies, politicians and even security forces.
“There is no doubt in my mind that the rule of law in areas that are particularly affected by violence and conflict needs to be consolidated through strengthening the presence and capacity of state civilian institutions,” said UN High commissioner Volker Turk during a fact-finding commission to the country in January.
Petro has promised to end conflict by negotiating directly with the armed groups themselves. The president announced ceasefires with the four largest criminal structures in the country in January, but all but one of them immediately fell apart in the days that followed.
“Aiming to turn the page on decades of bloodshed, the new Colombian government is working toward what it dubs ‘total peace’ with armed and criminal groups,” said International Crisis Group in recent public statements. “While laudable in many ways, this approach is also risky.”
And though progress has been made on the political front - a second round of peace talks with ELN in Mexico just came to a close - very little short-term progress has been made. The military strategies of occupying communities in conflict as if they were hostile territory continues.
As do massacres, and the killings of social leaders who dare to speak out against the armed groups who impose their will on ordinary Colombians. The International Crisis Group in Colombia estimates that seven million Colombians, or 15% of the total population of the country, live in regions where armed groups are the de facto government.
Petro promised to move away from the clearly failed military strategies of the civil war in an effort to combat the root causes of this conflict: rampant inequality, a lack of economic options in long-neglected rural areas and the failed ‘War on Drugs’ policies of his predecessors.
So far at least, 9 months into his term, it seems the military hasn’t gotten the memo.
The Big Headlines in LATAM
In Colombia, President Gustavo Petro yesterday presented an ambitious new labor reform. Headed by the Minister of Labor, Gloria Inés Ramírez, a long-time trade unionist, the initiative proposes increased labor rights for workers in the country, such as indefinite term contracts, respecting the eight-hour workday and generating new legal guarantees designed to protect unions.
One of the most controversial points has to do with companies who maintain phone applications such as Rappi, who have been strongly criticized for their “contract workers” policy which operates largely outside the protections of Colombian labor law. Under this new model their employees would be bound by an employment contract and would enjoy full legal protection. This has generated criticism from app companies who say that the measures would decrease employability.A cruel case of slavery was made public in Brazil. According to preliminary information, on February 22, police reportedly rescued more than 200 men from vineyards in the city of Bento Goncalves, in southern Brazil. The men were initially promised what appeared to be a significant job offer, food and lodging. Most of them came from poor backgrounds.
Once they were in the vineyards, what seemed like a good opportunity turned into a nightmare for the hundreds of people who were recruited there. They were forced to work more than 15 hours a day, were beaten and received little food. According to several local media, forced labor is a recurrent practice in northern Brazil.
Today, the newspaper El País published a letter sent by the former president of Perú, Pedro Castillo, to the Colombian president Gustavo Petro. In the letter Castillo expresses his gratitude, declares him his ally and tells him that there will be a lawyer in charge of handling his case.
Gustavo Petro was declared persona non grata by the Peruvian Congress after comparing the Peruvian police to Nazis during the numerous protests that took place in the country a few weeks ago. Petro disavows Dina Boluarte as legitimate president.
Spanish Word of the Week:
Desmadre:
We love this word. It doesn’t really have a direct literal translation to English, but perhaps “riot” or “chaos” is the closest approximation. But that doesn’t completely convey its meaning.
Perhaps a better translation would be “absolute shit-show”, or “a horrific chaotic mess”.
Mi vida es un desmadre total desde que me quedé sin trabajo. —My life has been complete chaos since I lost my job.
At PWS, we are very used to situations that could be described as “desmadres”. It is kind of our style. So cheers to all the piratas out there who have been through chaotic periods themselves.
And thank you as always for reading.